In the literature on the turn to the left in the wider Latin American region, Central America has generally been neglected. The aimof this article is to seek to fill that gap, while specifically assessing the left turn's impact on prospects for democratization in the sub-region. Using three case studies -El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua -the article questions the usefulness of transition theory for analysis and instead offers a framework based on state/civil society interaction within the context of globalization.
Introduction
In recent years the emergence of left and left of centre governments in Latin America -the so-called 'pink tide' -has been attracting much academic attention. 2 It is surprising, however, that little of this literature places the phenomenon within democratisation theory, particularly 'transitology', which held great sway over much political science analysis of Latin America in preceding years. 3 Furthermore, most of the literature on the 'pink tide' has understandably concentrated on South America, where the most notable left governments have emerged. Little attention has been paid to Central America, despite the fact that that this region was the centre of intense activity by the revolutionary left in the 1980s, and an intense right wing counteroffensive in the context of the Cold War, resulting in devastating civil conflicts.
Furthermore, it was subject to one of the first comprehensive international peace building processes in the post Cold War era, including internationally supported democratisation programmes. 4 The paper is based on three case studies-El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua. 5 It begins by offering a critical review of transition theory in order to foreground the importance of a relational analysis of civil society and the state for understanding processes of both democratisation and de-democratisation. This analysis concludes that it is necessary not only to take account of who controls the state, but also to analyse who constitutes civil society and what impact the existing correlation of forces within civil society has had on the state and its actions. These findings must be put within the context of globalisation -understood here as neoliberalism and its associated institutions -in order to accurately assess the impact on democratisation or de-democratisation processes on the polity under study.. This analytical framework is then used to argue that democratisation is not a linear process, but is subject to processes of de-democratisation. Historic continuities within Central America, namely the continued presence of deep structural inequalities remain central to the region's politics, but we argue these struggles are frequently sidetracked into unproductive personalistic and partisan politics. These findings open up wider questions about the blurring of boundaries between state, civil society and market and its impact on democratisation, especially within the current context of globalised neoliberal socio-economic structures. In this way the paper not only seeks to emphasise the importance of continued analysis of Central America for democratisation studies, but also to make an important contribution to debate on democratisation theory and its continued usefulness for political analysis globally.
Democratisation theory and the role of civil society
While Grugel identifies a number of distinct types of democratisation theory, it was transition theory, or 'transitology' which dominated the field in the 1980s, particularly with reference to Latin America. 'Transitology' sees democratisation as a process, led by cost-benefit calculations on the part of key actors. As such it has been subject to two major critiques. First, the very concepts of 'transition' and 'democratisation' were held to be inherently teleological in their assumptions, with a pronounced 'eurocentric' bias in what was deemed to be the ultimate democratic end-point.
Second, 'transitologists' concentrated on elite bargaining and procedural and institutional definitions of democracy, leading to difficulties in explaining the varying outcomes of democratisation processes, resulting in conceptual stretching by analysts. 6 In answer to the first critique on teleology, three points have been raised. First, democratisation needs to be viewed within a wide-angle, long term analytical perspective, perhaps from when it was first conceived in Ancient Greece, but certainly since the Enlightenment. 7 Second, democratisation is not a uni-directional process, but rather polities can experience periods of democratisation and de-democratisation, that is the 'expansion and contraction of popular rule'. 8 Third, all real or concrete political systems -be they established 'democracies' in the 'West' or 'authoritarian' regimes elsewhere -'exhibit to greater or lesser degrees democratic and autocratic traits '. 9 This also undermines the notion that the 'West' can act as a yardstick against which other regimes are measured. Hence, the end result of democratisation processes is not 'democracy' as established in the 'West', which is equally subject to such processes. To echo Barrett et al., ' it may be more appropriate to speak of democratisation as an ongoing, dynamic process than of democracy as a final end state' (emphasis in original).
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In answer to the second major critique of concentration on elite actions leading to problems in explaining outcomes, Grugel recommends focussing on the interaction between state and civil society within the context of globalization. First, for democratisation to occur the state has to undergo 'a substantive transformation in its operations and its representativeness', to give it the capacity to deliver 'better, more secure lives' for citizens. 11 Second, a shift in the power balance in civil society must take place to facilitate this transformation of the state. Finally, attention must be paid to globalization's impact on these processes in each state. 12 All these three factors will have impact on the depth and quality of different democratisation processes. She hence deals with the problem of structure, on the national and global levels, in explaining outcomes.
Grugel's framework points to the general agreement found in the literature on the centrality of civil society in democratisation processes, yet civil society itself is a contested concept. We argue here that the particularities of this empirical contestation
over who or what is civil society can offer important insights into democratisation processes. Analyses of civil society can be grouped into four perspectives. First, liberal perspectives see civil society as separate from state and market, having a watchdog role towards the former and an unproblematised relationship with the latter. 13 Second, an 'alternative' neo-gramscian perspective, emerging from sectors of civil society, sees it as a realm of struggle riven by inequalities, aimed at transforming the state to benefit the less privileged. 14 21 The conception and constitution of 'civil society' is therefore historically constructed and attention must be paid to the historical context in any assessment of its constitution, a theme we draw out here.
To sum up, democratisation must not be seen as a uni-linear process but rather as a constant, even daily struggle between democratizing and de-democratizing tendencies. Imperative to this is the need to place democratisation processes within the wider socioeconomic and structural contexts of neoliberal globalization, paying specific attention to the interaction between the state, civil society and the market.
Civil society, therefore, cannot be seen as a fixed entity, but one which is shaped by struggles between contending social forces at specific historical conjunctures. and ask what impact it has had on democratisation processes in the region, before going on to look more specifically at the situation in our three Central American case studies.
Democratisation, civil society/state relations and the emergence of the 'pink tide' in Latin America
The emergence of the 'pink tide' has been located in the failures of neoliberalism to deliver its promise of prosperity, with a concurrent 'democratic disillusion' towards the political system which promoted it. This rejection of neoliberalism was led by social movements which formed and found their voice during the neoliberal era, enriching and revitalising the left and sidelining the old social democratic parties, who were often responsible for the introduction and implementation of neoliberal policy.
Among the unifying characteristics of the new left governments which emerged from this dynamic, is a more pronounced search for equality to counteract the perceived increase in inequality and poverty left by neoliberalism in the region. 22 This is pursued in two principal ways: through democratic innovation and a policy agenda that seeks to lessen social inequality.
In the current context of 'pink tide' Latin America, civil society is increasingly conceived of as social movements (women, environmentalists, antiglobalisation activists, indigenous groups etc.). These social movements emerged as the chief counterbalance to the 'social forces of oppression' and are identified as 'the primary impetus for social and political change'. 23 This potential for change can best be realised through the adoption of participatory democracy, which is seen as a 'convergence between the deepening of democracy and…the revitalisation of civil society and its articulation with the state'. 24 As the key attribute of the state is seen as its capacity to intervene in social and economic relations, it is thus viewed as a 'strategic terrain' upon which contending social and political forces struggle in order to realise their strategies. 25 Social movements thus can transcend the narrow role assigned to civil society in liberal theory, aiming to transform the state both by redirecting its modes of intervention (in order to lessen social and economic inequalities and thus alter the balance of social forces) and transforming its forms of representation (in order to make it more accessible and thus more susceptible to pressure from below). Hence, the relationship between civil society (conceived of as social movements) and the state 'should be understood as a dialectical one'.
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Nonetheless, as many of the new left governments matured in power, this promise of a renewed contract between civil society and the state did not always materialise. 27 Boron offers three reasons for this. First and notable for our cases, the increased power of markets and their 'capacity for blackmail' (capital flight, investment strikes etc.) against governments which may introduce policies seen as detrimental to market interests. Second, 'the persistence of imperialism', either through conditionalites imposed in return for debt readjustment by the multilateral financial agencies and/or direct political demands from the United States such as the 'war on drugs' and bilateral aid systems. Both are policed through 'the ideological manipulation made possible by big capital's almost exclusive control of the mass media, the creators of the 'common sense' of our times'. Third, the devaluation of democracy in the preceding decades weakened the state's 'capacities for intervention in social life' 28 , further exacerbated by the many historical weaknesses of the state in Latin America. 29 Additionally many Latin American left governments have pursued a development model which privileges resource extraction, bringing it into conflict with many social movements, such as environmentalist and indigenous groups in particular, despite revenue from these being used, in some cases, to satisfy social demands. 30 All these factors seriously circumscribe the room for manoeuvre of the new left governments to deliver on their promises, causing disillusion and estrangement amongst many of the social movements which had brought them to power and impairing the prospects for the 'new deal' between state and civil society to consolidate itself.
To summarise, returning to our framework above, we find in the new left governments of Latin America, to greater or lesser degrees, on a local and/or national level, an attempt to reorient state/civil society relations by facilitating greater civil society influence over policy making processes. Many of these governments, rhetorically or more practically, privilege certain social movements as the 'actually existing' civil society. This interaction between social movements and government has resulted in a greater emphasis being placed on social policy directed at lessening poverty and inequality. This re-orientation of policy, however, is severely circumscribed by the influence of neoliberalism, at the international and national level, impairing its effectiveness and sowing distrust amongst the very social movements who were instrumental in creating the conditions for the left to gain power in the region. In other words the desired state/civil society alliance to advance equality and control the market is not emerging, primarily as a result of national and regional capital interests strengthened by globalisation processes.
While in this section we looked at the situation on state/civil society relations within Latin America in general, how has Central America been faring in the current context? The next section will examine these relations in Central America in historical context, concentrating specifically on the paper's three case studies: El Salvador, Nicaragua and Honduras, before examining empirical evidence from fieldwork in 2009-10. In the conclusion, we will evaluate the implications of these findings on democratisation theory and practice.
Democratisation processes in El Salvador, Honduras and Nicaragua in historical perspective
Following independence, liberal reform in Central America sought to break up traditional socioeconomic structures inherited from the colonial era and transform the state in order to facilitate an export oriented economy based on agricultural commodities. 31 In El Salvador this resulted in the development of a unified national bourgeoisie with strong institutions that were subservient to its needs. In Nicaragua 32 The wars had devastating impacts on Central America with 300,000 killed, 2 million refugees and an already weak social and economic infrastructure destroyed. In response, the international community launched a large and complex peace-building strategy in Central America, with democratisation processes at its centre. 33 Despite massive international investment, what resulted, however, were 'low intensity democracies', which go little beyond electoralism. 34 In all three countries elite domination continues of much of the economic and political infrastructure. The public in general suffers from a 'democratic disillusion', due to such factionalism and the inability of the state to solve problems of inequality, poverty and injustice. 47 The aim of this strategy was to include more 'progressive' elements of the traditional Salvadoran oligarchy in a pluralistic, modernising government thus increasing its room for policy manoeuvre while not entirely alienating local elites and their international allies. 48 Hence, civil society, which previously was associated with NGOs related to ARENA and business interests, has now became more pluralistic with representation from those NGOs traditionally associated with the FMLN and 'progressive' elements of the traditional oligarchy.
This has led to a cautious shift in the power balance within civil society.
Although civil society groups previously shut out from policy making now feel some After the coup, the Honduran state retrenched firmly to its servile position to the oligarchy, while 'civil society' became polarised into two main camps. Anti-coup groups consist of two main tendencies: those who were originally supporters of the president and those who supported the return of the constitutional order, but did not necessarily support Zelaya. The social base of these groups consists of indigenous, peasants, feminists, progressive sections of the Catholic Church, labour unions, LGBT groups etc. Those supporting the coup are business groups, the media, the church hierarchy, including the country's Cardinal Rodriguez, the two main political parties, the Human Rights Ombudsman, the Armed Forces, the police and, crucially, the main institutions of the state. Mass media campaigns and marches, heavily protected by the army and police have framed these groups under a careful rhetoric of national unity and claiming to be the true voice of 'civil society', calling themselves the 'whites', in an effort to symbolise peace and purity. 58 This stands in stark contrast with media portrayals of the anti-coup groups who were dubbed as 'mobs' and 'undesirables'. In more than a rhetorical act, these groups have rejected the label 'civil society' in favour of what they consider the more inclusive terminology of 'National popular resistance movement' (FNRP).
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Social divisions were not a consequence of the coup but were made visible by it, both at the national and international level. These fissures are further crossed by ideological views of democracy. Pro-coup groups understand democracy as the existing institutional configuration that benefits elite interests: order is prioritised over Human Rights as the massive repression of social movements since 2009 has attested. 60 One business leader suggested that this 'peaceful' handover of power was in fact a 'great test for Honduran democracy' and not a coup at all. These actions are framed within a wider geopolitical strategy, whereby the FSLN government seeks to achieve greater room for manoeuvre for such policy experimentation through the establishment of alliances with new international actors, while attempting to refrain from overly alienating other key actors with considerable power over Nicaragua. Nicaragua has joined the Venezuelan led Petrocaribe and ALBA initiatives, allowing it to avail of cheap oil at low credit rates, as well as accessing considerable funding for development projects. Equally, Nicaragua has formed a close relationship with Russia, leading to a number of preferential deals.
Nonetheless, it has maintained scrupulously circumspect relations with the IMF, ensuring prompt payment of debt, a key issue for this heavily indebted nation, although the Ortega government has managed to alienate key donors due to its disputes with NGOs. as a totalitarian project aimed at perpetuating Ortega and the FSLN in power. The government claims that polarisation is media driven and mostly Managua based but many fear that it is so acute that it has caused irreparable damage to the political process. 68 Poll evidence suggests that polarisation directly affects the Nicaraguan public's trust in both government and civil society. Thus, it is difficult to imagine in the current context how these diametrically opposed visions can be reconciled, and trust in political elites, and their civil society allies, strengthened. Finally, the paper highlights the usefulness of studying Central America in this respect, since few areas in Latin America have been quite so exposed to the combination of extreme oligarchic power and outside interference. This has heightened ideological and economic polarisation within these countries, with a determining effect on their political processes. As this paper shows, in the context of the 'pink tide' this can provide valuable data on how these processes can be affected negatively by personalised politics and elite interests, the latter further strengthened by neoliberalism and globalisation.
These findings therefore strengthen our position on transition theory as set out in the introductory sections. As we stated, two main critiques have been levelled at that theory; that it is inherently teleological-and 'eurocentric' -in its assumptions, and that its concentration on elites and institutions lead to difficulties in explaining outcomes in democratisation processes. In response to these critiques and following Grugel, we emphasise the need to pay attention to civil society/state interaction on the national level, and within the wider context of globalisation. 70 Key to this more nuanced understanding is our contention that most societies have been subject to both democratizing and de-democratizing tendencies within a long term open-ended historical struggle -in other words that democratisation is not a uni-linear process, much less one which will terminate in 'democracy' as it is assumed to exist in the 'West'. This demands an analysis of this struggle within the wider limits of neoliberal governance, questioning the conventional liberal separation between state, civil society and market. Finally, we stated that while civil society is a central concept to help understand democratisation processes it cannot be viewed as a fixed entity but one shaped by the contending social forces of a particular historical conjuncture, a struggle in which the state has a crucial determining role.
It is not out intention to argue that democratisation theory is of no analytical benefit. Indeed we argue that it is crucial for accurate analysis of political developments in Latin America and beyond, but the paper underlines the need for a radical re-evaluation of its central tenets. In particular there is a need to depart from transition theory and all its teleological implications. We agree with Whitehead (2002) that a wide-angled historical and analytical lens is required, rather than the usual focus in transition theory on a narrow time scale and sets of actors, but depart from the liberal perspective underlying his thesis. We argue instead -moving closer to a neo-Gramscian approach -that democratisation theory should centre analysis on empirical phenomena arising from class based, open-ended and simultaneous struggle within the interlinked terrains of civil society, state and market. With such a renewed perspective difficulties such as conceptual stretching and teleological assumptions can be avoided, allowing democratisation theory to remain an essential tool for future political analysis within the current uncertain global context.
